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SELFDEFENSE,
THE 2ND

The Supreme
Court’s decision
in District of
Columbia v.
Heller,
is both more
and less than
what either its
admirers
or detractors
claim. Of
course, no one
can predict
where Heller
will actually
lead. But if one
looks at Heller
alone, one can
put it into context which indicates that, at
least for
the present,
Heller is a rather
unremarkable
decision..
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By:
Richard L. Aynes

I

n recent times, some legal scholars have
borrowed a term from statistics and pursued the idea of “outliers.” The application to law is a simple one: the Supreme
Court is more likely to find unconstitutional
the action of an “outlier” than it is the action
of a governmental unit that is in step with the
overwhelming majority of other governmental units.
If one looks at gun ownership and regulations in America, there is a remarkable and
strong consensus about gun ownership as expressed through the regulations of the 50
states. If the actions of their representatives
are even in some rough way representative
of the views of the majority of the citizens of
those states, then a majority of the people in
the 50 states believe at least some rather large
group of citizens ought to be able to own
guns. These views are probably based upon
what individuals deem to be good public policy, whether the ultimate claims are grounded
upon the 2nd Amendment, some other provision of the U.S. Constitution, state constitutions, or simply the legislation that is or is not
passed by the state legislatures.
At the same time, the very same legislative process suggests a large majority of the
people in each of the 50 states believe access
to guns and gun use must be regulated in
some way. Regulations that are common to
all of the states includes a limitation on what
type of weapons can be owned, where they
can be fired and who can own them. For example, it is commonly accepted that mentally
ill people and felons should not be able to
possess firearms.
The District of Columbia has a somewhat unique position, not being simply a city
and yet not quite being a state. However, the
District could be analogized to a state, having
a population larger than that of Wyoming and
close to the populations of Vermont and
North Dakota. Notwithstanding its unique
status, if one looks at D.C. as analogous to a
state, what the District did was go where no
state had gone before and completely outlaw
handguns. Further, as interpreted by Justice
Scalia and the majority, it outlawed the use
in self-defense of weapons that were allowed
to be kept in one’s home.
As a result, the D.C. legislation made its
restrictions on weapons possession and use
go far beyond what the national and state
governments had done. Indeed, Justice Scalia
states that “[f]ew laws in the history of our
Nation have come close to the severe restrictions of the District’s handgun ban.” This
made the D.C. legislation an “outlier” and
ripe for being suspect under the Constitution.
Of course, the Court does not simply declare a statute unconstitutional because it is
an outliner. There must a constitutional basis

for taking that action. In this case, that basis
began in the 2nd Amendment and found that
it guaranteed what has frequently been called
an “individual” right to bear arms. While the
majority opinion had support in its interpretation of the 2nd Amendment, it does little
more than require the renegade District to
conform to the views of the 50 states.
At the same time, Justice Scalia’s opinion upholds the other portion of the national
consensus, by reassuring the nation that the
right is “not unlimited” citing English and
American authorities. Indeed, Justice Scalia
goes out of his way to try to reassure people
that not much would change, and as examples that are not exhaustive states:
“. . . nothing in our opinion should
be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions of the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the
carrying of firearms in sensitive
places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the
commercial sale of arms.”
Indeed, on the last page of the majority
opinion he writes: ”The Constitution leaves
the District of Columbia a variety of tools for
combating [handgun violence], including
some measures regulating handguns.”
Though I understand why they did so,
D.C. probably made a strategic mistaken in
banning handguns from one’s home while allowing disassembled rifles to be present. Justice Scalia writes an “ode” to the handgun as
a weapon of self-defense, especially in one’s
own home. Though it was in the context of
the rifle that was required to be disassembled
or trigger locked, Justice Scalia found that it
could not be used in emergency needs for
self-defense in one’s home. Yet if handguns
were allowed and a lock requirement were
imposed, they could be stored in a “biometric safe,” which fits in a drawer and only
opens upon the reading of one’s fingerprint.
At least as advertised in Sportys.com, this
provides “[i]nstant access with just one finger” and “[r]ecognition takes less than a second for quick access.”
No own knows for sure where the line
will be drawn, but it is at least reasonable to
think that if D.C. had banned handguns outside of the home and had required “biometic
safes” inside of the home, both gun regulation and instant access for home self-defense
would have been served.
It appears the allowance of rifles
(unassembled or with a trigger lock), was a
concession to those who may have owned
weapons they wanted to use elsewhere. In
oral argument the counsel for the District
“conceded” that the rifle could be made op-

erative and used in self-defense. However,
because of its greater range the rifle would
actually be a greater menace to innocent bystanders and because of its length, a less effective weapon for self-defense.
This is not to say that Justice Scalia’s
opinion is without its flaws – if it was this
would not be a 5-4 decision.
First, on the very first read I wondered
why the opinion did not stop earlier at a natural stopping point. I assume that perhaps
Justice Scalia felt compelled to continue in
order to answer some issues posed by some
of the briefs, the oral argument, or even discussion at the Court’s conference. But it
struck me as not only a stylistic mistake to
drone on after he had made his key points but
also an unwitting admission that he knew
there was weakness in his basic opinion.
Second, the text of the 2nd Amendment is
at least open to debate, and its meaning turns
upon what role one attributes to the militia
portion of the clause. The history of the
amendment, and its meaning, is fiercely debated by people holding competing views.
On one hand we have seen at least a decade
in which there have been concerned efforts
by pro-gun advocates to publish research that
supports the view the Court reached. On the
other hand anti-gun advocates have produced
numerous articles including one 600-page
symposium in which every author concluded
the 2nd Amendment has a meaning contrary
to that of the majority. Yet, Justice Scalia
writes as if this was a very clear case with
which no one could reasonbly disagree.
Third, one of the least acceptable aspects
of Justice Scalia opinion is his reading of the
D.C. statute. When Justice Breyer, in dissent,
cites statutes with prohibitions on gun use
from our early history, Justice Scalia wrote
in one instance that it was “inconceivable”
that the law would have been applied in a
self-defense situation and in another instance
he found it “unlikely.”
Yet, even when the counsel for the D.C.
government “conceded” that the law on shotguns and rifles allowed one to use those
weapons in self-defense, Justice Scalia refused to accept the concession and insisted
on reading the D.C. statute – unlike the historical statutes – as prohibiting self-defense.
A fourth problem with the decision was
Justice Scalia’s linkage of the right to bear
arms to self-defense. To be sure, this has political advantages. The national consensus
upon the right to act in self-defense is even
greater than the national consensus upon the
ability to have arms. Thus, linking the two
was rhetorically and politically powerful. But
the 2nd Amendment makes no mention of
self-defense. Moreover, there is no mention
of self-defense in the debates cont. on Page 7
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in Congress or ratification about self-defense.
I am not suggesting the national consensus on self-defense is incorrect. However, it
rests more firmly upon the 5th and 14th
Amendments due process clauses. One of the
few decisions to address this issue is State v.
Hardy, 60 Ohio App. 2nd 325, 329 (1978):
“ The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution provide that a person may
not be deprived of his life, liberty
or property without due process of
law. Obviously, the state may not
require and does not intend that an
individual succumb to his attacker
and possibly forfeit his life rather
than act in self-defense.”
Thus, if the state required one to die
rather than act in self-defense, it would be
depriving those who obeyed the statute of
their life without due process of law. There
are other provisions that would more properly support self-defense such as the 9th
Amendment, the privileges and immunities
clause of Article IV, and the privileges or immunities clause of the 14th Amendment. Any
of these approaches would be more textually
related and more doctrinally sound than linking self-defense to the 2nd Amendment.
I am not suggesting there is no link between self-defense and the use of a gun. But
I am suggesting the link is not an inevitable
one. We know there are many instances in
which people act in self-defense when no
gun is involved; where some other weapon
is used; or, in some instances, where someone unarmed acts in self-defense against
someone who is armed.
This is not to say the dissent had the better part of the argument. Yet, at this point the
dissent is less important in trying to find out
what the case actually changed. When one
thinks about the future of the Heller, the
question of enforcing the 2nd Amendment
against the states (commonly called incorporation, though the better term is nationalizing the right), it is unclear whether there is a
majority upon the Court that would extend
the right to apply against states. Given the
philosophical proclivities of the Justices in
the majority and reservations expressed in
past opinions, one could not predict with certainly that the majority could be mustered to
apply Heller to the states.
On the other hand, Justice Breyer (with
whom Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsberg
joined) is able to dismiss the link between
practice in using weapons and militia service
only by noting that people in D.C. can still
own rifles and shotguns and use them outside
of the District. This argument loses its force

outside of urban D.C. The briefs of former
military officers indicated that “[m]ilitary recruits with previous firearms experience and
training are generally better marksmen and
accordingly better soldiers.” Indeed, many
historians believe that the success of the Soviet Union at the battle of Stalingrad was
based upon its snipers and the success of its
snipers was based upon the civilian hunting
experience of its soldiers.
If they are going to be intellectually consistent, then when the incorporation case
comes up – as it will—one of these four Justices might well vote to extend the protections of Heller to apply against the states. In
his book The Bill of Rights, Yale’s Southmayd Professor Akhil Amar makes a powerful case that whatever the meaning of the
Second Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to protect the weapons of
African Americans and other Unionists to be
used in self-defense against the terrorists during Reconstruction.
While discounted by the majority, Justice Stevens’ dissent is surely correct when
he suggests the number of federal cases on
gun regulations will increase dramatically.
Given past history where we see, sometimes
for better and for worse, an initially limited
decision expanded by later decisions, it is impossible to believe that any attorney worth
his/her salt will not feel obligated to assert a
Heller defense in almost every gun regulation case. There has already been an unsuccessful challenge where it was claimed that
Heller allowed guns to be present in a certain portion of the Atlanta airport. Mr. Heller
himself is back in court challenging the revised D.C. statute. Until such time as a majority of the Court reaffirms its position on
the limited nature of Heller, counsel have no
other choice but to raise this defense.
Justice Stevens also referred to not
knowing what other “dominoes” will fall
after Heller. But the simple response is that
we never know. No matter what the Court
says by way of limiting its current opinion,
we never know whether the Court will extend that opinion in later cases or whether it
will adhere to its articulated limitations.
Thus, I think for now Heller is best
viewed as simply reining in an outlier. If the
lower courts go too far in interpreting the
reach of Heller, the Court will have an opportunity to rein them in just as it reined in
the D.C. or take the next step by expanding
Heller. People of differing views may have
reasonable hopes and fears about Heller. But
we really will not know whether those will
be realized for many years. □
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